As we previously discussed, the American Arbitration Association requested comments on proposed changes to its Consumer and Employment Arbitration Rules.

We submitted comprehensive comments on the proposed amendments on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the American Financial Services Association, and the Automotive Alliance for Innovation. The comments identify ways in which the proposed changes can be modified to ensure fairness for all parties while reducing the risks of potential abuse of the arbitration process. 

Notably, the comments focus heavily on the urgent need for action to curb abusive mass arbitrations. We have discussed the issue of mass arbitrations in more detail in the Chamber’s white paper and our report about the AAA’s January 2024 announcement of new mass arbitration rules and fee schedules.

We’re hopeful that the AAA takes these comments into account and updates its proposed rule changes to account for the issues we have identified.

The American Arbitration Association has announced that it has drafted potential amendments to its Consumer Arbitration Rules and Employment Arbitration Rules, and is seeking comments on those proposed revisions. The AAA has posted the proposed new Consumer and Employment Rules, charts comparing the new Consumer and Employment language to the current language, as well as summaries of the extensive revisions (one for the Consumer Rules changes and one for the Employment Rules changes).

We are evaluating the proposed changes, which are numerous. The deadline to submit comments is February 28, 2025. We anticipate working with members of the business community to submit comments on the proposed changes.

We have written before about the well-documented rise of abusive mass arbitrations, which seeks to weaponize arbitration clauses to try to extract a settlement from the targeted business, regardless of the merits of the underlying claims. The goal of these mass-arbitration filers is to inflict such high upfront costs on the targeted business—which pays most of the fees of consumer and workplace arbitrations—that it’s simply too expensive to contest the merits of any claim.  With alarming frequency, mass arbitration campaigns are reported to include claims that are obviously frivolous (such as claims filed in the names of people who are fictitious, deceased, or never purchased the product or service at issue).

Given the obvious unfairness of the practice, both arbitration providers and companies have been responding. For example, arbitration providers such as the AAA and JAMS have been adopting new mass arbitration rules and fee schedules to try to ameliorate some of the worst abuses. And companies have been revising their arbitration agreements to adopt new safeguards and new methods to ensure the efficient and fair resolution of mass claims.

One widely adopted method by companies is modeled on the multidistrict litigation process used by federal courts to address mass torts claims. Under the MDL process, courts sometimes conduct trials of a few bellwether cases to facilitate the orderly informed settlement of the remaining cases. Many companies have adopted a similar bellwether process for mass arbitrations.

The Ninth Circuit is currently considering a legal challenge to an arbitration clause that uses staged bellwether proceedings for mass arbitrations in Pandolfi v. AviaGames, Inc. In that putative class action, the plaintiffs are resisting enforcement of the arbitration clause in the company’s terms by arguing that the use of bellwether proceedings in arbitration is unconscionable under California law. After the district court accepted that argument, the company appealed the denial of its arbitration motion.

Along with our colleagues Andy Pincus and Jennifer Weinberg, we have filed an amicus brief on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States. As we explain in the brief, the district court’s unconscionability analysis failed to recognize the benefits of bellwether clauses in preventing abusive mass arbitrations and the fact that bellwether clauses are modeled after procedures commonly used in courts. In addition, we argue, the Federal Arbitration Act preempts the district court’s holding that bellwether clauses are unconscionable under California law because that reading of California law impermissibly disfavors arbitration.

We’ll be watching Pandolfi closely to see how the Ninth Circuit rules, so stay tuned for more developments.

Businesses have long argued that federal courts cannot grant class certification when members of the proposed class would lack Article III standing to bring their own claims. The Supreme Court is now poised to provide an answer. Last Friday, the Court granted review in Laboratory Corp. of America v. Davis to decide “[w]hether a federal court may certify a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) when some members of the proposed class lack any Article III injury.” (Rule 23(b)(3) is the provision that governs certification of virtually all damages classes.) This issue is critical to class action litigation, and one that the Supreme Court left open in TransUnion v. Ramirez and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins. (We, along with our colleague Andy Pincus and others at the firm, represented the petitioner in Spokeo and filed an amicus brief in TransUnion.)

Continue Reading Supreme Court to decide important case on Article III standing at the class-certification stage in damages class actions

Abuse of the arbitration system by plaintiffs’ lawyers through the filing of mass arbitrations is by now well-documented, including in a paper we authored for the Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for Legal Reform. Companies have responded by revising arbitration agreements to address this abuse, and arbitral forums have adopted new default rules to govern mass arbitrations when the issue is not addressed in the arbitration agreement.

Not surprisingly, plaintiffs’ lawyers—hoping to retain the ability to coerce settlements through mass-arbitration filings—are challenging contract provisions and arbitral forum rules that address the issue.

A panel of the Ninth Circuit recently refused to enforce the arbitration agreement in Ticketmaster’s terms of service, rejecting the company’s attempt to address the problem of mass arbitration by incorporating the rules of a new arbitration provider (New Era). That decision—Heckman v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc.—is flawed in several respects. But more important for most businesses, the decision is narrow and rests on the unique aspects of the New Era rules adopted in the Ticketmaster agreement. Plaintiffs’ lawyers are already arguing that Heckman sweeps more broadly, but that approach misreads the opinion and, in addition, contravenes Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).

A majority of the Heckman panel first concluded that the arbitration agreement’s use of New Era’s rules was unconscionable under California law. Second, the entire panel—both the majority and the concurring judge—held that New Era’s rules transformed mass arbitrations into a type of arbitration so unlike traditional individual arbitration that (in the panel’s view) the FAA no longer applies. And the panel went on to say that without the FAA, which (as the Supreme Court held in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion) preempts California’s Discover Bank rule against waivers of class arbitration, Ticketmaster’s arbitration agreement was invalid under Discover Bank.

This post first describes the relevant background and the Ninth Circuit decision. We then explain why that decision is limited to New Era’s unique approach to mass arbitration—and that any broader reading of the decision is barred by the Supreme Court’s holdings in Concepcion and subsequent cases.

Continue Reading Ninth Circuit holds that arbitration agreement adopting New Era’s mass-arbitration rules is unconscionable—but the decision is narrow and limited to New Era’s unique rules

In recent years, parties entering into class settlements—largely at the urging of courts—have sought to boost the rate at which class members participate in those settlements by reducing gating requirements for submitting claims. In an increasing number of cases, claims are flooding in. But all too often, a meaningful percentage of those claims are fraudulent. And the tools used to submit these improper claims are being used to subvert other parts of the legal system.

Continue Reading The implications of skyrocketing fraudulent claims in class action settlements

The Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in Wallrich v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. is significant news in the world of mass arbitration. In recent years, businesses have faced an increasing risk of being targeted by abusive mass arbitration campaigns that seek to leverage the arbitration fees the business must pay, win or lose, to coerce a settlement of even meritless claims. In Wallrich, Samsung was facing a mass arbitration that it contended was based on meritless claims; among other things, Samsung said, some of the claimants were not really Samsung customers at all.

Continue Reading Seventh Circuit reverses order forcing Samsung to pay arbitration fees for mass arbitration

The AAA recently announced a new set of rules of mass arbitrations, as well as new fee schedules for consumer and worker arbitrations. We and some of our colleagues wrote a Legal Update about the changes, how they impact businesses, and whether the updates might help with widespread abuses in mass arbitrations.

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. creates substantial uncertainty over whether companies that register to do business in certain states can be subject to personal jurisdiction for claims unrelated to the forum—because those states require consent to general jurisdiction as a condition of registration. Mallory involved a Pennsylvania law treating registration to do business “as a foreign corporation” as a “sufficient basis” for “general personal jurisdiction” over that corporation.

In a splintered set of opinions, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the law under the Due Process Clause. Five Justices agreed that—in this case—assertion of jurisdiction based on the Pennsylvania law was not unconstitutional as a matter of due process. But one of those five Justices (Justice Alito) indicated that the due process issue might be resolved differently under other facts. And Justice Alito strongly suggested in his concurrence that the dormant Commerce Clause might prohibit a state from requiring consent to general personal jurisdiction as a condition of doing business. The four dissenting Justices would have held that jurisdiction based on the law violates the Due Process Clause.

The Pennsylvania courts are likely to consider (at minimum) the dormant Commerce Clause challenge on remand. In the meantime, the fractured nature of the Court’s opinions—combined with the reality that, despite the result, five Justices have questioned the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s requirement—ensures further litigation over so-called “consent-by-registration” jurisdictional statutes.

Continue Reading Supreme Court rejects Due Process Clause challenge to Pennsylvania statute requiring out-of-state corporations to consent to jurisdiction as a condition of registering to do business

Today the Supreme Court held that when a party files an immediate appeal of a federal district court order denying arbitration, the district court must stay its proceedings relating to the merits (including discovery) during the appeal. The decision in Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski will have a significant impact in federal courts in California and New York in particular, where the prior regime had given district courts wide discretion over whether to grant full or partial stays pending appeal or to deny stays altogether.

As we anticipated from attending the oral arguments, the Justices were closely divided on the issue. In an opinion for the Court written by Justice Kavanaugh, the Court held, by a vote of 5-4, that “the district court must stay its proceedings” pending the outcome of the appeal.

Continue Reading Supreme Court holds that district courts must stay proceedings pending appeals of orders denying arbitration