Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), a court may certify a suit for damages as a class action when “there are questions of law or fact common to the class” that “predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” Similar certification standards apply when a plaintiff seeks to certify a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Yesterday, in its highly anticipated decision in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo (pdf), the Supreme Court affirmed the certification of an FLSA collective action where the evidence tying class members together was a study of a representative sample of similarly situated workers.

Continue Reading Supreme Court affirms certification of FLSA collective action in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo

330px-Supreme_Court_Front_Dusk-150x120.jpgArticle III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to “cases” and “controversies.” As the Supreme Court recently explained in Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk, a lawsuit does not present an Article III case or controversy and “must be dismissed as moot” when “an intervening circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a ‘personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit,’ at any point during the litigation.” Today, in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez (pdf), the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s unaccepted offer to satisfy the claims of a named plaintiff in a putative class-action lawsuit is not sufficient to render the suit moot.
Continue Reading Supreme Court holds that an unaccepted offer of judgment doesn’t moot a class action

In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) preempts state-law rules barring enforcement of an arbitration agreement if the agreement does not permit the parties to utilize class procedures in arbitration or in court. Before Concepcion, the law of California included that limitation on the enforceability of arbitration agreements, but Concepcion declared that rule invalid as a matter of federal law. Yesterday, in DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia (pdf), the Supreme Court held that Section 2 preempts a state-law interpretation of an arbitration agreement based on a legal rule that the state’s courts had applied only in the arbitration context, concluding that the state-law ruling “does not rest ‘upon such grounds as exist . . . for the revocation of any contract.’”

(We filed an amicus brief on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in support of DTV.)


Continue Reading Supreme Court Holds that Federal Arbitration Act Preempts California Court’s Interpretation of Arbitration Clause

The Supreme Court on Tuesday heard oral argument in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, No. 14-1146, a case that has been closely watched for its potential to narrow the circumstances in which a class action may be certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and a collective action for unpaid wages certified under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). We previously described this case in prior blog posts. One of us attended the argument, and the other closely reviewed the transcript (pdf). Our combined reaction: The anticipated decision in this case may focus on an FLSA issue and, if so, then it seems unlikely to mark a sea change in the rules governing Rule 23 class actions.
Continue Reading Supreme Court Hears Argument in Tyson Foods v. Bouaphakeo—and a Blockbuster Class Certification Ruling Seems Less Likely

Can a named plaintiff press ahead with a class action if he or she “won’t take ‘yes’ for an answer”? That colorful question, which Chief Justice Roberts asked counsel for the respondent during oral arguments yesterday in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, is at the heart of the debate over whether offers of judgment can moot class actions. By the end of the oral argument (pdf), it seemed clear that a number of the Justices were concerned about allowing a plaintiff whose individual claims would be fully satisfied by an offer of judgment to nonetheless invoke the machinery of the federal courts.

Continue Reading Can an Offer of Judgment to the Named Plaintiff Moot a Class Action? Supreme Court Hears Arguments in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez

court-gavelToday, the Supreme Court granted review in what may be a major decision on the standards for class certification, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, No. 14-1146.
Continue Reading Supreme Court to Revisit Class-Certification Standards in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo

330px-Supreme_Court_Front_DuskThe Supreme Court will decide before the end of this Term whether to hear any or all of four important cases that raise recurring questions of class action law that have sharply divided the lower courts. These cases address questions that we have blogged about before (e.g., here and here): whether a class full of uninjured members may be certified, and whether plaintiffs may rely on experts and statistics to gloss over individualized differences among class members in order to prove their class claims and damages. These questions strike at the heart of what it means to be a “class,” because class actions generally must be litigated using common evidence to show that each class member has been harmed.
Continue Reading Supreme Court To Decide Whether To Hear Four High-Stakes Cases Asking When A Suit May Be Litigated As A Class Action

Supreme Court imageArticle III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to “cases” and “controversies.” The Supreme Court has held that “‘an actual controversy … be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.’” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997). Accordingly, “[i]f an intervening circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a ‘personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit,’ at any point during litigation, the action can no longer proceed and must be dismissed as moot.” Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1528 (2013). In Genesis, the Court recognized that one “intervening circumstance” may arise under Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which permits a party to offer to allow judgment in favor of its adversary on specified terms. A party who rejects a Rule 68 offer, but obtains a judgment “not more favorable than the unaccepted offer,” must pay the costs accrued by the offering party between the offer and judgment. (We’ve previously blogged about Genesis.)

Today, the Court granted certiorari in Campbell-Ewald Company v. Gomez, No. 14-857, to determine whether a defendant’s unaccepted offer of judgment, made before a class is certified, that would fully satisfy the claim of a would-be class representative renders the plaintiff’s individual and class claims moot. The Court also granted certiorari to decide whether the derivative sovereign immunity doctrine recognized in Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940), applies only to claims for property damage caused by public works projects.


Continue Reading Supreme Court to decide whether an offer of judgment for full relief moots a named plaintiff’s class-action claims

Under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, a plaintiff must allege that he or she has suffered an “injury-in-fact” to establish standing to sue in federal court. Today, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, No. 13-1339, to decide whether Congress may confer Article III standing by authorizing a private

As readers of this blog know, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the California Supreme Court (and a number of other state courts) had declared that waivers of class-wide arbitration were unenforceable as a matter of state law. But in Concepcion, the Supreme Court held that the